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# Proactive Response Strategy for Energy Delivery Systems

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#### THE POWER-GRID IS VULNERABLE

#### **RESPONSE SELECTION ARCHITECTURE**

- An attack on the US power grid has an estimated cost of \$1 trillion to the US economy
- Cyber attack on Ukraine power grid left 225000 users without power





- We leverage the outcomes of our fusion algorithms to drive our  $\bullet$ strategic response algorithms and commands to respond to different types of observed attacks
- Our goal is to build self-healing and self-reconfiguring networks to  $\bullet$ isolate infections and maintain operation.

#### SOME RESULTS FROM OUR WORK

- The power grid is increasingly reliant on its cyber infrastructure for timely and reliable transmission and delivery
- Attackers are employing varied and sophisticated techniques targeting different parts of the grid
  - Denial of Service attacks from the Public Networks
  - Compromise of residential and commercial loads then move into more impactful areas of the network
  - Lateral movement In the Ukraine incident, attackers spent a significant amount of time moving within the network to reach the control center

## **RESEARCH VISION**

We aim to develop techniques for fast and reliable detection of attacks and effective response through control commands.

#### **RESEARCH ROADMAP**

Monitor Deployment and **Compromise Detection** 







- T=6 T=3 (P2 T=4 T=1 **Host-View** T=0 **S1** Socket Host Process
- We built a detection scheme for Lateral Movement by fusing:
  - host-level process communication and,
  - network flow information
- We use process communication to infer correlation between network flows
  - Host-level agents collect the communication events and build a process communication graph
- Hierarchical fusion of events results in a chain of correlated connections that describes lateral movement in the system
- Detecting and stopping correlated chains helps preventing attackers from reaching critical assets

#### IMPACT ON STATE OF GRID SECURITY

#### Impacts on Your System

- Protected with proactive response algorithms, your system would:
  - detect attacks, reducing the manual load of monitoring alerts by human operators
  - contain an intrusion and provide semi-automatic response actions
  - run the system, possibly in a degraded state, until recovery is possible.

- We detect attacks by optimizing the deployment of our monitors
  - Our goal is to maximize our ability to detect attacks while minimizing the cost to do so
  - Monitors can also be compromised. We employ redundancy and statistical methods to detect compromised monitors
- Using our diverse monitors, we fuse different sources of data to increase the accuracy of our detection techniques, such as
  - Network level information
  - Host level information
  - Load and generator information

#### **Business Benefit**

- Reduced outages and complex manual processes  $\bullet$
- Increased Data security and Cyber resilience

## COLLABORATION OPPORTUNITIES

#### **Cooperation, support and guidance from industry** partners in the following areas would benefit this research activity:

- Specifications concerning the security requirements of the industry
- Datasets to better understand the systems and evaluate monitoring and detection techniques
- Discussions about the requirements for responses to attacks through control commands
- Contact: <u>nouredd2@Illinois.edu</u>, <u>abohara2@Illinois.ed</u>  $\bullet$
- Activity webpage: <a href="https://cred-c.org/researchactivity/proresponse">https://cred-c.org/researchactivity/proresponse</a>

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