



GRID VULNERABILITY TO SPOOFING ATTACKS

- GPS provides accurate and precise time synchronization for PMUs to perform wide area monitoring and control
 - GPS time accuracy $\sim 100ns$ and frequency accuracy $\sim 10^{-12}Hz$



- According to [IEEE-C37.118.1](#), to maintain grid stability, the maximum allowable phase angle error is 0.573° (\sim timing error of $26.5 \mu s$)
- Civil GPS signals are susceptible to malicious spoofing attacks
 - The received signal power is as low as $-130dBm$; the civil signal structure is unencrypted and known to the public
 - An attacker broadcasts counterfeit civil GPS signals and manipulate victim receivers' time and time drift solutions
- Incidents of GPS spoofing attacks reported in the recent past
 - In 2017, around 20 maritime vessels near the coast of Novorossiysk, Russia were effected by a mass spoofing attack
 - At the ION GNSS+ 2017, numerous devices reported incorrect time and position due to accidental spoofing caused by a leaky simulator



RESEARCH GOALS



- Address the GPS vulnerability by investigating spoofing attacks that adversely affect PMU accuracy
- Devise algorithms to counteract these attacks, thereby enabling the adoption of GPS/GNSS synchronized PMUs while advancing power grid resiliency

OUR ARCHITECTURE


Key aspects:

- Multiple receivers**
 - Geographical diversity
 - Known receiver positions
- Direct Time Estimation (DTE)**
 - Directly works in the timing domain
 - Detects spoofing attacks
- Joint Particle and Kalman Filter**
 - Locates the ground spoofer


Geographically distributed receivers within power substation



OUR ALGORITHM DETAILS



Detection of spoofing signals




To detect and distinguish malicious peaks indicating spoofing, **time delayed similarity** is identified across the geographically distributed receivers


OUR RESEARCH RESULTS

- Simulated meaconing causing $30\mu s$ time delay is added to authentic data collected in open sky
- Geometry of multiple receivers comply with the Ameren Illinois Power Substation, Kansas, IL
- Our Joint Filter demonstrates spoofer localization to within $3m$ and accuracy of GPS time to within $1.5\mu s$

GPS timing accuracy using Kalman Filter



Spoofer localization using Particle Filter: t=0s on left to t=1.8s on the right



IMPACT ON POWER GRID

Performance benefits:

- By implementing our algorithm, the power system would:
 - Provide synchronized phasor measurements up to $100ns$ accuracy
 - Reduce the system risks against external timing attacks
 - Ensure continued robust performance even in degraded scenarios.
 - Elevate the maturity of wide area monitoring for future power grids

Business benefits:

- Minimal added hardware and infrastructure costs
- Increased timing resilience and precise time synchronization

POTENTIAL COLLABORATION OPPORTUNITIES

Cooperation, support and guidance from industry partners in the following areas would benefit this research activity:

- Inputs regarding the details of PMU setup including latencies, communication network and processing capabilities
- Specifications regarding the expected response time to counteract the timing attacks on the PMUs
- Platform for power stability analysis via datasets or test bed setup to validate the impact of our algorithm
- Contact: gracegao@illinois.edu, sbhamid2@illinois.edu
- Activity webpage: <https://cred-c.org/researchactivity/robust-and-secure-gps-based-timing-power-systems>